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Abstract	
Over	the	past	20	years,	indigenous	groups	across	Latin	America	have	gained	
significant	ground	in	their	respective	countries’	national	politics.		Factors	relating	to	
institutional	reforms	and	effective	populist	appeals	have	created	several	successful	national	
indigenous	parties	in	Bolivia	and	Ecuador	in	particular.		Guatemala	is	a	case	that	many	
scholars	are	puzzled	by	because	it	shares	many	similarities	of	the	Ecuadorian	and	Bolivian	
political	and	ethnic	landscapes,	but	has	not	developed	a	national	indigenous	party.		
	 The	research	pertaining	to	the	rise	of	Latin	American	indigenous	parties	can	be	
understood	in	two	prominent	groups.	Institutionalists	point	to	changes	in	electoral	rules	as	
a	determining	factor.	In	addition,	institutionalists	concentrate	on	nationwide	politics,	not	
local	politics.	The	second	group,	ethnopopulists,	explain	that	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	
is	due	to	these	parties	making	indigenous	and	populist	claims	without	alienating	the	non-
indigenous	population.		However,	neither	of	these	approaches	adequately	addresses	this	so-
called	“failure”	of	the	Maya	in	Guatemala	to	form	a	pan-Mayan	party.		
	 This	thesis	challenges	both	of	these	narratives	by	focusing	on	Mayan	participation	at	
the	local	level.	I	argue	that	traditional	institutions	at	the	city/village	level	influence	the	
Mayan	population	to	participate	locally.	Additionally,	divisions	within	the	Mayan	
community	prevent	a	level	of	unity	necessary	to	build	a	political	party	to	run	at	the	national	
level.	Although	I	question	the	limitations	of	these	two	approaches,	I	find	it	unlikely	a	pan-
Mayan	will	form	in	the	foreseeable	future	due	to	the	Mayas	preference	to	participate	solely	
at	the	local	level			
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The	rise	and	success	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	has	been	a	surprising	
development	the	past	couple	of	decades,	leading	scholars	to	explain	the	rise	of	successful	
indigenous	movements	in	countries	like	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	and	Peru.	Within	the	research	
there	is	a	divide	between	two	approaches	to	understanding	indigenous	parties.	One	group	
of	scholars	emphasizes	institutional	reforms	and	learning	effects	from	other	countries	to	
explain	the	success	of	indigenous	movements	and	parties	in	the	region.	The	other	group	
emphasizes	how	successful	indigenous	parties	develop	a	programmatic	platform	and	make	
inclusive	appeals	that	allow	them	to	appeal	to	the	non-indigenous	populations.	Combined,	
this	research	has	allowed	for	better	understanding	of	the	success	of	indigenous	parties	and	
candidates	in	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	and	Peru.			
	 However,	a	case	that	is	often	overlooked	when	evaluating	indigenous	political	
participation	in	Latin	America	is	Guatemala.	A	quick	glance	at	Guatemala	would	appear	to	
make	it	a	very	likely	case	to	develop	an	indigenous	party.	It	has	a	very	large	indigenous	
population,	40	to	60	percent	of	the	population.	It	has	a	semi-active,	semi-strong	indigenous	
movement	that	was	instrumental	in	ending	Guatemala’s	36-year	civil	war	and	gaining	the	
recognition	of	indigenous	rights	in	law.	However,	since	the	end	of	the	war	and	signing	of	
peace	accords	in	1996,	the	indigenous	movement	has	not	coalesced	into	an	active	political	
movement.	There	have	been	some	efforts	to	mold	the	Mayan	movement	into	a	political	
party,	such	as	Winaq	led	by	Nobel	Peace	Prize	winner,	Rigoberta	Menchu,	which	is	the	first	
national	Mayan	party	in	Guatemala.	But	it	has	only	received	around	3	percent	of	the	vote	in	
the	most	recent	presidential	elections.		
	 Due	to	this	fact,	many	researchers	treat	Guatemala	as	an	outlier	case	in	comparison	
to	other	Latin	American	countries	with	active	indigenous	movements	and	label	it	as	a	
‘failed’	case.	However,	I	argue	that	this	is	a	misguided	view	of	Mayan	political	participation	
in	Guatemala	because	Mayan	political	participation	is	more	diverse	than	national	parties.	
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Instead	a	fuller	evaluation	of	Maya	political	participation	should	focus	not	at	the	national	
level	but	at	how	Mayan	groups	participate	at	the	local	level.	Mayan	communities	tend	to	
focus	locally	and	do	not	necessarily	want	or	need	to	move	past	this	level	of	government.	The	
argument	that	Mayans	participate	locally	is	the	focus	of	this	thesis.		
This	paper	makes	use	of	the	2012	Latin	American	Public	Opinion	Project	(LAPOP)	
survey	for	Guatemala	and	applies	a	model	of	indigenous	voting	as	proposed	by	Madrid	
(2012)	to	Guatemala.	After	looking	at	the	results	of	the	survey,	I	evaluate	the	literature	that	
assesses	other	potential	explanations	of	Mayan	political	participation.	From	this	literature,	
it	can	be	seen	that	labeling	Guatemala	as	a	failure	is	misleading.			
First,	I	will	cover	the	existing	literature	on	the	advantages	of	indigenous	parties	in	
Latin	America.	There	is	a	considerable	support	for	the	argument	that	having	an	indigenous	
party	is	beneficial	to	the	indigenous	people	and	to	political	stability	and	democracy.	Next,	I	
will	review	the	key	arguments	in	this	literature	by	institutionalists	and	ethnopopulists.	
Then,	I	will	run	models	predicting	vote	for	an	indigenous	candidate	in	Guatemala.	Next,	I	
will	look	at	the	literature	that	explains	the	different	routes	of	participation	by	the	various	
Mayan	groups	in	Guatemala.	Finally,	I	will	conclude	with	thoughts	for	future	paths	of	
research	in	regards	to	Mayan	politics	in	Guatemala.	
Why	Indigenous	Parties?	
	 What	are	the	advantages	of	indigenous	parties?	Why	can’t	mainstream	parties	
address	indigenous	concerns?	These	questions	are	of	concern	when	evaluating	the	need	for	
indigenous	parties.	Previous	research	demonstrates	how	mainstream	parties	have	failed	to	
represent	indigenous	groups.	Usually	mainstream	parties	will	pay	lip	service	and	gain	
recognized	rights	for	indigenous	groups	in	law	but	this	will	be	the	extent	of	the	help	(Van	
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Cott	2010a).	Because	of	this	fact,	indigenous	parties	should	be	able	to	advance	indigenous	
rights	and	needs	more	than	mainstream	parties.		
Madrid	(2005a)	argues	indigenous	parties	could	lead	to	the	improved	
representation	of	indigenous	groups	and	expand	participation	that	has	been	limited	by	
historical	injustices	and	marginalization	within	Latin	American	societies.	In	addition,	
indigenous	parties	could	reduce	systemic	volatility,	increase	the	support	for	democracy,	and	
reduce	violence.	Marginalization	of	Latin	America’s	indigenous	peoples	has	occurred	under	
both	authoritarian	and	democratic	governments	and,	therefore	has	discouraged	indigenous	
groups	from	being	active	within	the	political	arena.	Mainstream	parties	will	sometimes	
adopt	some	of	the	issues	important	to	the	indigenous	community	and	try	to	gain	the	
support	of	indigenous	voters	by	supporting	indigenous	politicians	(Van	Cott	2010a).	
However,	this	support	is	often	symbolic	and	not	truly	representative	of	indigenous	needs	or	
wants.	On	the	other	hand,	when	an	indigenous	party	runs	for	office,	there	is	a	higher	chance	
indigenous	people	will	participate	in	politics	and	establish	a	stronger	connection	between	
elected	officials	and	their	constituents.		
	 When	indigenous	parties	gain	representation	in	a	legislature,	Madrid	(2005b,	
2005c)	argues	that	they	reduce	systemic	volatility	and	party	system	fragmentation.	Nations	
with	the	highest	rates	of	electoral	volatility	have	a	large	percentage	of	the	population	that	is	
indigenous	because	indigenous	groups	are	underrepresented	and	make	up	a	large	
percentage	of	the	population.	Indigenous	populations,	more	often	than	not,	do	not	trust	
mainstream	parties	to	represent	their	interests	and,	therefore,	do	not	participate	in	
elections.	Thus,	the	indigenous	community	is	underrepresented	and	not	included	in	the	
political	process.	Mainstream	parties	fail	to	adequately	represent	the	views	and	needs	of	the	
indigenous	community	and	cannot	establish	a	foothold	in	the	indigenous	community.	This	
creates	an	opening	for	indigenous	parties	to	form	and	gain	the	trust	of	the	indigenous	
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community.	Thus,	indigenous	parties	can	then	give	a	voice	to	the	indigenous	community,	
bringing	this	community	back	into	the	active	political	arena,	and	ideally	leading	to	more	
stability	of	the	party	system.		
	 In	short,	Madrid	(2005a)	implies	that	indigenous	parties	could	lead	to	an	increase	in	
support	for	democracy	and	a	reduction	in	politically	oriented	violence.	Indigenous	parties	
create	a	voice	for	the	indigenous	population,	and	would	presumably	foster	support	for	
democracy.	Indigenous	populations	in	numerous	Latin	American	states	do	not	support	
democracy	at	the	same	level	the	non-indigenous	population	does;	they	tend	to	be	wary	of	
democratic	institutions.	Madrid	(2005a)	shows	this	through	by	using	data	from	various	
surveys	from	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s	such	as	Latino	barometer	and	LAPOP.			 	
	 Madrid	also	discusses	how	increased	indigenous	representation	can	lead	to	a	
decrease	in	the	use	of	extreme	measures	to	raise	political	awareness.	He	examines	
indigenous	protests	in	Bolivia	that	led	to	widespread	death	and	destruction	prior	to	MAS.		
In	Bolivia,	the	non-violent	rise	of	indigenous	parties	such	as	MAS	showed	that	the	
indigenous	populations	no	longer	felt	the	need	to	protest	and	use	violence	to	be	heard.	
Ideally,	indigenous	populations	begin	to	believe	they	have	an	outlet	to	be	heard	and	will	not	
resort	to	violence	once	they	have	an	indigenous	party	that	represent	their	views.	 	
Institutionalists	versus	Ethnopopulists	
Research	evaluating	the	rise	and	success	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	is	
demarcated	between	two	differing	theoretical	approaches.	The	first	theoretical	approach	
concentrates	upon	the	role	of	institutions.	These	scholars	evaluate	the	effect	of	institutional	
change	in	understanding	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America.	Their	thesis	is	that	
institutional	change,	such	as	change	in	party	registration	rules,	change	in	district	
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magnitude,	and	new	electoral	rules,	have	had	a	positive	effect	on	indigenous	party	
formation	and	success.		
The	second	theoretical	approach	focuses	upon	the	strategies	indigenous	parties	use,	
specifically	ethnopopulism.	Scholars	from	this	theoretical	approach	argue	that	indigenous	
parties	in	the	region	have	been	most	successful	is	when	they	run	as	ethnopopulist	parties	
and	can	appeal	to	the	indigenous	population	and	groups	within	the	non-indigenous	
population.	By	evaluating	these	two	theoretical	approaches,	it	brings	to	light	how	neither	
camp	can	fully	explain	indigenous	political	participation	in	Guatemala	and	how	there	is	a	
need	to	evaluate	participation	there	in	a	different	light.	
Institutionalist	Approach	
Institutional	arguments	for	understanding	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	
America	are	very	prominent	within	the	literature.	Institutional	scholars	evaluate	whether	
changes	in	institutions	have	created	the	environment	that	has	encouraged	indigenous	party	
formation.	Concentration	upon	institutional	change	is	due	to	in	the	past	couple	of	decades	
numerous	Latin	American	countries	have	implemented	institutional	reforms	to	encourage	
the	participation	of	underrepresented	groups	(McNeish	2008).	The	institutions	these	
scholars	most	often	cite	are	registration	rules,	electoral	rules,	district	magnitude,	and	
reserved	seats.			
The	most	prominent	of	the	institutional	scholars	is	Donna	Lee	Van	Cott.	Her	
research	is	concentrated	in	South	America,	where	indigenous	parties	have	had	the	most	
success.	Much	of	her	research	concentrates	upon	institutional	reform	and	its	effects	on	
indigenous	parties	primarily	in	South	America.	Her	findings	have	shown	institutions	do	
matter	but	that	they	alone	cannot	explain	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	in	South	America.		
Van	Cott	(2003)	evaluates	institutional	change	in	six	South	American	countries:	
Argentina,	Colombia,	Peru,	Venezuela,	and	more	in-depth	case	studies	of	Bolivia	and	
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Ecuador.	In	this	study,	Van	Cott	demonstrates	how	changes	in	institutional	rules	have	a	
positive	effect	on	indigenous	party	success.	Van	Cott	concentrates	upon	regulations	placed	
on	political	parties	that	reduce	the	number	of	parties	elected.	She	finds	that	when	these	
regulations	are	eliminated	and	party	systems	become	decentralized,	it	makes	it	easier	for	
indigenous	parties	to	form	and	have	success	since	they	do	not	need	to	raise	funds	for	a	
nationwide	campaign.	She	also	examines	how	reserved	seats	lead	to	indigenous	parties	to	
gain	power.	In	addition,	Van	Cott	discusses	other	rule	changes	that	impact	the	rise	of	
indigenous	parties	such	as	increasing	district	magnitude.	Where	district	magnitude	was	
increased,	such	as	in	Colombia,	it	has	led	to	indigenous	parties	gaining	political	power.	Van	
Cott	concludes	while	these	institutional	changes	have	influenced	the	rise	of	indigenous	
parties,	they	alone	cannot	explain	their	rise	and	success.		
Van	Cott	(2010b)	finds	institutional	factors	continue	to	play	a	strong	role	in	
indigenous	party	formation	and	success	a	decade	and	a	half	after	these	parties	first	emerged	
on	the	political	scene.	She	uses	data	from	Bolivia,	Colombia,	Ecuador,	Venezuela,	Peru,	and	
Argentina	to	demonstrate	how	institutional	factors	are	key	to	whether	an	indigenous	party	
will	form	and	have	success.	The	institutional	factors	Van	Cott	identifies	as	key	to	indigenous	
party	formation	and	success	are	increased	ballot	access,	decentralization,	and	the	
reservation	of	seats	for	indigenous	representatives.	
	In	addition	to	these	rule	changes,	Van	Cott	identifies	openness	of	the	party	system	
as	crucial	to	indigenous	party	formation	and	success.	While	not	a	rule,	this	explanation	fits	
neatly	into	the	institutional	argument	for	understanding	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties.	
Indigenous	parties	had	an	opening	in	the	party	system	due	to	the	decline	of	left-leaning	
parties	since	the	1980s.	When	these	parties	declined,	this	created	an	opening	for	indigenous	
parties	to	gain	a	foothold	and	address	indigenous	demands	in	the	political	system.	Thus,	it	
can	be	concluded	an	open	party	system	falls	into	the	institutional	argument.		
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Van	Cott	and	Rice	(2010)	find	that	social	cleavage	and	institutional	explanations	for	
the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	can	explain	some	of	the	rise	of	indigenous	
parties.	However,	both	conclude	that	more	explanation	for	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	is	
needed.	Van	Cott	and	Rice	believe	that	political	learning	and	diffusion	must	also	be	taking	
place	in	order	to	account	for	the	rise	of	successful	indigenous	parties.	In	addition,	they	
believe	that	the	indigenous	movements	organizationally	are	maturing,	which	allows	for	
explanations	outside	of	institutional	arguments.	There	is	also	increasing	de-alignment	and	
party	fragmentation	throughout	the	region	and	the	recognition	of	indigenous	rights	in	law.	
Thus,	Van	Cott	and	Rice	argue	that	institutional	and	social	cleavage	literature	alone	cannot	
explain	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties.	
Birnir	(2004)	evaluates	how	changing	one	rule	in	an	institutional	environment	helps	
indigenous	parties	gain	political	power.	She	evaluates	the	effect	costs	have	on	party	
formation.	She	defines	“formation	costs”	in	the	same	terms	as	Simon	Hug	(2001),	which	are	
the	institutional	barriers	a	new	party	must	overcome	in	order	to	participate	in	an	election	
or	continue	participating.	Using	this	understanding	of	formation	costs,	Birnir	concentrates		
on	pre-election	formation	cost	by	evaluating	the	effect	of	spatial	registration	rules	on	
indigenous	party	formation.		
Birnir	uses	evidence	from	Bolivia,	Guatemala,	Mexico,	Peru,	and	a	more	in-depth	
case	study	of	Ecuador	to	demonstrate	how	pre-election	spatial	registration	rules	are	a	
hindrance	to	the	formation	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America.	Pre-election	spatial	
registration	rules	are	simply	a	requirement	on	political	parties	that	they	have	registered	
members	in	different	parts	of	a	country.	The	effect	of	such	rules	can	be	detrimental	to	
political	parties	concentrated	in	one	area	of	the	country.	For	example,	Birnir	finds	in	
Ecuador	the	requirement	for	indigenous	organizations	to	have	registration	in	both	the	
highlands	and	coastal	areas,	in-spite	of	the	fact	there	were	very	few	indigenous	groups	in	
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the	coastal	regions,	led	to	indigenous	organizations	in	Ecuador	struggling	to	gain	political	
power.	Once	these	rules	were	eliminated	in	1995,	Ecuador	saw	the	success	of	indigenous	
parties.	Birnir	finds	a	similar	effect	in	Peru,	where	there	were	spatial	registration	rules	in	
place	before	being	eliminated.		
Birnir	is	not	claiming	the	elimination	of	registration	requirements	alone	led	to	the	
success	of	indigenous	groups	in	Ecuador	and	Peru.	Her	main	conclusion	is	the	elimination	of	
these	rules	creates	a	more	welcoming	institutional	environment	for	indigenous	groups	to	
gain	political	office.	While	there	are	other	factors	influence	formation	of	indigenous	parties,	
Birnir	concludes	elimination	of	these	rules	would	help	in	the	formation	of	indigenous	
parties.		
In	all,	the	intuitionalist	approach	has	led	to	greater	understanding	for	why	
indigenous	parties	have	developed	and	continue	to	have	success.	These	scholars	have	
identified	the	various	changes	in	electoral	rules	and	party	environment	positively	
influenced	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America.	They	have	also	shed	light	on	
steps	indigenous	or	ethnic	parties	need	to	pursue	to	change	rules	that	make	gaining	office	
easier	for	these	groups.		
Ethnopopulist	Approach	
The	second	theoretical	approach	for	understanding	the	rise	of	indigenous	parties	is	
the	ethnopopulist	argument.	The	ethnopopulist	research	thesis	is	that	the	rise	and	success	
of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	is	due	to	how	indigenous	political	parties	have	
presented	themselves	and	how	they	run	campaigns.	Scholars	using	this	lens	for	
understanding	indigenous	participation	argue	what	explains	indigenous	success	is	
indigenous	political	parties	run	as	ethnopopulist	parties.	These	parties	make	indigenous	
appeals	to	the	indigenous	population	along	with	inclusive	appeal	to	non-indigenous	groups.	
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Ethnopopulist	parties	also	make	populist	appeal	by	promising	the	mass	population	of	
change	and	taking	power	away	from	the	elites	(Madrid	2008;	Madrid	2012).		
Madrid	(2012)	looks	at	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	Peru,	Guatemala,	Colombia,	Venezuela,	and	
Nicaragua.	The	core	of	Madrid’s	argument	is	that	indigenous	parties	that	have	had	the	most	
success	are	the	ones	that	have	made	appeals	to	both	the	indigenous	and	non-indigenous	
populations.	In	addition	to	parties	appealing	to	both	groups,	successful	indigenous	parties	
have	used	populist	appeals	to	create	as	large	of	an	electoral	coalition	as	possible.	Populist	
appeals	have	been	a	very	powerful	method	for	appealing	to	both	indigenous	and	non-
indigenous	supporters	because	of	the	increasing	distrust	and	disillusionment	of	current	
political	parties	and	those	parties’	neo-liberal	orientation.	The	two	most	successful	cases	
Madrid	cites	are	Evo	Morales	with	MAS	in	Bolivia	and	Pachakutik	in	Ecuador.	Morales	and	
his	party	MAS	have	been	highly	successful	because	they	have	combined	indigenous	and	
non-indigenous	representation	and	offered	an	alternative	to	the	neoliberal	economic	
outlook	of	other	parties	in	Bolivia.	Parties	in	Ecuador,	on	the	other	hand,	have	pursued	a	
different	route	in	recent	years.	Pachakutik	was	able	to	achieve	success	in	Ecuador	similar	to	
MAS	in	Bolivia	by	employing	this	inclusive	tone	and	platform.	However,	Pachakutik	in	the	
mid-2000s	began	using	a	more	exclusionary	tone,	appealing	strictly	to	indigenous	
populations	and	alienating	non-indigenous	groups.	They	did	not	reach	previous	levels	of	
support	or	actual	representation	when	they	had	this	more	inclusive	strategy.	Madrid	does	
not	discount	the	other	factors	of	institutional	reform,	indigenous	movements,	and	change	in	
party	system	rules,	but	feels	the	most	important	aspect	is	whether	parties	have	tried	to	
move	beyond	the	indigenous	community	for	support	and	whether	this	can	explain	
indigenous	party	success.				
	 Madrid	tests	the	ethnopopulist	thesis	by	developing	a	model	of	predicting	vote	for	
an	indigenous	party	by	individual	citizens.	These	models	use	share	of	presidential	vote	as	a	
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means	to	measure	success	of	an	indigenous	party.		Along	with	identifying	the	key	individual	
level	factors,	Madrid	describes	the	necessary	macro-level	factors	to	achieve	success,	which	
are	institutional	reform,	the	decline	of	traditional	parties,	the	use	of	ethnic	appeals,	and	the	
use	of	populist	and	inclusionary	appeals.		
In	sum,	the	ethnopopulist	approach	is	more	of	a	strategy	for	indigenous	parties	to	
take	than	any	reform	or	action	within	government.	This	approach	does	not	discount	the	
effects	of	institutional	reform	or	implementation	of	new	rules.	However,	it	does	view	the	
strategy	of	indigenous	parties	as	the	crucial	aspect	to	the	success	of	these	parties.			
Both	the	institutionalist	and	ethnopopulist	approaches	are	incomplete	in	their	
explanations	of	the	formation	and	success	of	indigenous	parties.	The	institutional	approach	
is	lacking	because	of	its	concentration	on	national	level	politics.	It	does	not	give	much	
attention	to	local	level	politics.	On	the	other	hand,	the	ethnopopulist	approach	makes	
assumptions	about	the	homogeneity	of	an	indigenous	group	and	assumes	all	an	indigenous	
party	needs	to	do	is	implement	the	ethnopopulist	strategy	and	success	will	come.	In	the	
next	section,	these	missing	aspects	will	be	apparent	in	why	both	approaches	have	simply	
written	Guatemala	off	as	a	“failed	case.”			
Indigenous	Politics	in	Guatemala	
	 In	the	previous	section,	the	debate	between	the	institutionalists	and	ethnopopulists	
highlights	divisions	within	the	literature	for	understanding	the	rise	and	success	of	
indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America.	However,	there	are	cases	within	Latin	America	that	do	
not	fit	either	explanation	for	indigenous	party	formation	and	success.	One	such	case	is	
Guatemala.	This	case	is	interesting	because	Guatemala	has	many	similar	characteristics	as	
other	countries	in	the	region	but	has	not	seen	the	formation	of	a	successful	indigenous	
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party.	The	failure	of	a	successful	indigenous	party	in	the	country	has	led	to	scholars	to	be	
bewildered	why	a	successful	party	has	not	developed	in	Guatemala.		
	 The	reason	for	this	bewilderment	is	due	to	the	characteristics	of	Guatemala.	It	has	a	
very	large	indigenous	population	with	estimates	ranging	from	40	percent	of	the	population	
to	60	percent	(Madrid	2012).	This	size	of	population	would	seem	to	lead	to	a	high	
probability	of	a	large	indigenous	party.	However,	this	has	not	come	to	pass.	There	is	an	
indigenous	party	in	Guatemala,	Winaq,	but	it	has	only	received	around	3	percent	of	the	
popular	vote	in	the	previous	two	presidential	elections	(Madrid	2012).	Due	to	this	reality	it	
has	led	to	scholars	to	investigate	why	there	has	not	been	a	more	successful	indigenous	party	
in	Guatemala.		
	 Research	on	indigenous	parties	in	Guatemala	is	also	demarcated	between	
institutional	and	ethnopopulist	arguments	for	the	lack	of	a	successful	indigenous	party.	The	
institutionalists	tend	to	emphasize	the	underinstitutionalization	of	Guatemala’s	party	
system	and	structural	factors,	such	as	historical	violence	and	discrimination,	Ethnopopulist	
scholars,	on	the	other	hand,	cite	the	one	Mayan	party	in	Guatemala,	Winaq,	and	its	electoral	
strategy.		
Institutional	Approach	in	Guatemala	
	 Much	of	the	institutionalists’	concentration	in	Guatemala	is	evaluating	indigenous	
participation	is	at	the	national	level.	Research	focuses	on	the	party	system	or	lack	thereof.	
Guatemala	has	an	underinstitutionalized	party	system	that	has	been	called	an	“inchoate”	
party	system	or	even	a		“non-system”	(Jones	2011;	Sanchez	2008;	Sanchez	2009).		
	 Scholars	of	Guatemala’s	party	system	demonstrate	how	political	parties	come	and	
go	and	its	destabilizing	effect	on	democracy.	Because	parties	come	and	go,	they	do	not	have	
roots	in	society	and	are	often	the	vehicles	of	elites	in	Guatemala.	However,	because	parties	
come	and	go,	it	does	show	party	formation	is	not	a	costly	endeavor	and	could	be	a	positive	
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factor	in	influencing	the	formation	of	indigenous	parties.	Therefore,	these	scholars	
demonstrate	there	is	the	possibility	of	an	indigenous	party	to	develop	with	relative	ease	but	
they	do	discuss	that	the	most	successful	political	parties	are	vehicles	for	the	political	elite.		
	 Scholars	of	Guatemala’s	party	system	highlight	many	issues	indigenous	
organizations	face	in	forming	and	being	a	successful	political	party.	One	issue	is	the	most	
successful	parties	tend	to	be	well	financed.	This	is	problematic	for	many	indigenous	
organizations	since	they	are	a	discriminated	against	group.	Another	issue	is	building	
alliances	in	Guatemala’s	Congress.	Because	parties	come	and	go	with	ease,	it	is	very	difficult	
to	build	alliances	for	effecting	policy.		
	 This	area	of	institutional	research	highlights	the	difficulties	indigenous	
organizations	face	in	Guatemala	in	their	efforts	to	develop	a	Mayan	political	apparatus.	
While	party	formation	might	be	a	possibility	for	indigenous	groups,	it	is	hard	to	run	a	
campaign	nationwide.	In	addition,	it	would	be	tough	to	build	any	lasting	alliances	since	
party	come	and	go	with	ease.		
	 Other	institutional	scholars	have	more	directly	evaluated	indigenous	participation	
in	Guatemala.	They	highlight	how	candidates	can	run	as	independents	and	not	have	to	be	
attached	to	a	political	party	(Hale	2002;	McNeish	2008).	These	scholars	also	discuss	the	few	
successful	cases	of	indigenous	political	leaders	having	success	at	the	ballot	box.	One	such	
case	is	Rigoberto	Queme	Chay	in	Quetzaltenango.	He	was	elected	mayor	in	1995	and	1999	
(Rasch	2011a;	Copeland	2011).	However,	outside	of	Queme,	there	have	been	very	few	cases	
of	indigenous	politicians	gaining	elected	political	office.		
	 Another	trend	in	institutional	research	in	regards	to	Guatemalan	indigenous	parties	
is	to	evaluate	sub-national	means	of	participating.	One	means	through	which	the	Mayan	
population	in	Guatemala	participates	is	civic	committees	at	the	local	level	(Pallister	2013).	
Civic	committees	are	short-term	committees	organizations	can	create	to	support	a	politician	
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for	elected	office.	The	advantage	of	these	committees	is	they	can	be	temporary,	lasting	
through	the	electoral	campaign	and	dissolved	after	the	campaign.	This	institutional	rule	
might	be	influential	in	Mayans	not	attempting	to	move	past	the	local	political	level	and	build	
a	nationwide	political	infrastructure	because	they	have	representation	at	the	local	level.	In	
addition	to	civic	committees,	there	is	historic	and	present	violence	and	discrimination	
against	the	Mayan	population	in	Guatemala.	This	reality	discourages	Mayans	from	wanting	
to	move	past	the	local	level	of	government	(Pallister	2013).	
Ethnopopulist	Approach	in	Guatemala	
	 The	ethnopopulist	approach	describes	efforts	in	the	1970s	by	those	in	the	Mayan	
movement	to	build	a	more	cohesive	and	united	political	movement.	However,	this	was	
prevented	due	to	the	Mayan	population	being	targeted	during	Guatemala’s	civil	war	
(Warren	2003).	After	the	return	of	democracy	in	the	1980s,	the	Mayan	movement	was	a	
crucial	player	in	helping	broker	the	agreement	that	ended	the	conflict	in	1996.	In	spite	of	
this	success,	the	movement	was	not	able	to	translate	this	unity	into	a	viable	political	
movement.		
	 	Madrid	(2012)	comments	on	the	fact	that	with	the	Mayan	movement	having	some	
unity,	it	would	seem	Guatemalan	Mayans	would	have	an	opportunity	to	form	a	successful	
indigenous	party.	In	his	evaluation	of	Winaq,	he	critiques	the	fact	its	leadership	has	not	
followed	the	ethnopopulist	model	for	winning	political	office.	Winaq	is	led	by	Nobel	Peace	
Prize	winner,	Rigoberta	Menchu.	She	is	known	throughout	Guatemala	and	especially	in	the	
Mayan	community.	However,	she	has	not	run	Winaq	like	Evo	Morales	in	Bolivia.	She	does	
make	ethnic	appeals	along	with	being	inclusive	of	Ladinos	but	does	not	make	populist	
appeals.	She	does	not	make	populist	appeals	in	fear	of	upsetting	the	business	community	in	
Guatemala.	In	addition,	she	is	not	connected	to	the	Mayan	grassroots	movement.	Winaq	is	
headquartered	in	Guatemala	City,	which	is	far	removed	from	the	center	of	the	Mayan	
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community,	which	is	located	in	the	northern	part	of	the	country.	Seemingly	it	appears	that	
the	enthopopulist	literature	believes	that	if	Menchu	were	to	pursue	a	more	ethnopopulist	
approach,	Winaq	would	have	more	success.			
	 Overall,	the	research	on	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	is	divided	between	
institutional	arguments	and	ethnopopulist	arguments.	This	divide	is	also	present	in	the	
literature	on	Guatemala.	Understanding	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	research	will	
allow	for	better	understanding	of	indigenous	parties	in	Latin	America	and	in	Guatemala.		
Research	Design	
	 In	the	previous	section,	it	was	demonstrated	the	divide	in	the	literature	between	
institutional	and	ethnopopulist	approaches	to	understanding	indigenous	party	formation	
and	success	in	Latin	America	and	Guatemala.	In	the	rest	of	this	thesis	I	will	show	how	both	
of	these	approaches	miss	important	aspects	of	Mayan	participation	in	Guatemala.	The	
ethnopopulist	approach	misses	many	key	factors	about	Mayan	groups	in	Guatemala.	It	
appears	to	make	the	assumption	that	if	Winaq	would	only	do	what	Evo	Morales	was	able	to	
do	in	Bolivia;	it	would	then	start	to	have	more	electoral	success.	This	assumption	is	
problematic	because	if	a	pure	ethnopopulist	approach	would	be	a	successful	strategy	then	
Winaq	or	some	other	indigenous	party	would	have	implemented	it.		
Institutionalists,	on	the	other	hand,	show	that	institutions	matters	in	the	formation	
and	success	of	indigenous	parties	in	other	countries	in	Latin	America	and	could	be	a	
positive	impact	in	Guatemala.	However,	what	is	missed	in	this	approach	is	institutionalists	
are	not	looking	at	the	right	level	of	government.	What	needs	to	be	evaluated	are	Mayan	
institutions	at	the	local/village	level	of	government.	As	I	will	demonstrate,	there	are	
numerous	traditional	institutions	and	divides	within	the	Mayan	community	which	leads	to	
Mayans	participating	at	the	local	level	of	government	but	not	moving	past	it	to	build	a	
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nationwide,	pan-Mayan	party.	Looking	at	this	level	of	government	will	allow	for	greater	
understanding	of	Mayan	participation.	Participation	at	the	local	level	nullifies	the	
assumption	that	Guatemala’s	indigenous	population	is	not	active	politically.	
The	empirical	section	of	this	paper	has	two	parts.	First,	I	will	run	an	empirical	model	
with	data	from	the	2012	LAPOP	survey	for	Guatemala.	This	model	closely	follows	Madrid’s	
(2012)	ethnopopulist	model.	The	difference,	however,	is	this	model	will	test	to	see	if	
support	for	a	hypothetical	indigenous	candidate	is	along	the	lines	of	an	ethnopopulist	
approach.	Then,	I	will	demonstrate	how	Mayans	participate	at	the	local/village	level	of	
government	through	traditional	and	modern	institutions.	In	addition,	I	will	show	how	
divisions	within	Mayan	ethnic	identity	also	play	a	role	in	the	struggle	to	build	a	successful	
pan-Mayan	party.		
Hypothesis		
	 The	hypothesis	I	will	be	testing	is:		
H1:	Voters	with	an	indigenous	identity	are	more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	party	
or	leader	in	Guatemala	than	those	who	are	Mestizo	or	speak	Spanish	as	their	mother	
language	
To	test	for	this	hypothesis,	this	paper	will	run	multiple	models	to	see	if	there	are	similar	
mechanisms	in	Guatemala	compared	to	what	Madrid	has	hypothesized	should	happen	for	a	
successful	indigenous	party.	This	paper	will	run	similar	models	for	Guatemala	but	will	have	
different	independent	variables	due	to	some	questions	asked	in	the	Bolivia	survey	that	were	
not	asked	in	the	Guatemalan	one.	The	motivation	for	testing	this	hypothesis	is	to	see	if	there	
is	demand	for	an	indigenous	leader	by	the	indigenous	population.	Failure	to	falsify	this	
hypothesis	will	mean	that	there	is	not	demand	for	an	indigenous	leader	by	the	indigenous	
population.		
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Dependent	Variables	
This	paper	uses	the	2012	LAPOP	survey	data	in	the	analysis.	From	the	survey,	I	use	
two	questions	for	the	dependent	variables	for	the	two	models.	The	first	dependent	variable	
is	derived	from	the	question,	“Would	you	vote	for	an	indigenous	person	for	president?”	This	
question	is	asking	what	this	paper	wants	to	evaluate:	vote	for	an	indigenous	
party/candidate.	In	the	original	questionnaire,	the	question	is	coded	as	“yes,”	“no,”	“no	
response,”	or	“do	not	know.”	I	have	recoded	it	as	a	binary	variable	where	a	person	would	
vote	for	an	indigenous	person	for	president	is	coded	as	1	and	a	person	who	would	not	vote	
for	an	indigenous	person	for	president	is	coded	as	0.	For	this	model,	I	run	an	ordinary	logit.		
In	addition,	I	run	a	second	model	with	a	dependent	variable	derived	from	the	
question	asking	citizens	if	they	think	dark	skinned	leaders,	referring	to	indigenous	people,	
would	make	good	political	leaders.	The	original	question	from	the	survey	is,	“In	general,	
people	with	dark	skin	are	not	good	political	leaders.	Do	you	strongly	agree,	agree,	disagree	
or	strongly	disagree,	with	this	statement?”	It	is	on	a	scale	of	strongly	disagree,	disagree,	
agree,	or	strongly	agree.	Because	the	variable	is	on	a	scale	of	strongly	disagree	to	strongly	
agree,	I	run	an	ordered	logit	model.		
	 	The	logic	for	running	models	with	these	dependent	variables	is	to	evaluate	whether	
the	results	hold	up	across	the	survey.	An	issue	both	models	have	is	a	relatively	low	N.	This	is	
due	to	respondents	not	answering	the	questions	that	are	the	dependent	variables.	By	
running	both,	it	can	be	seen	if	similar	mechanisms	hold	up	across	the	different	models.		
Independent	Variables	
	 The	key	independent	variables	are	identity,	language,	and	support	for	indigenous	
education.	Identity	is	coded	as	white,	Ladino,	indigenous,	black,	mulatto,	or	of	another	race.	
The	reason	for	this	variable	is	to	evaluate	whether	there	is	a	difference	between	the	Ladino	
and	indigenous	populations	of	their	support	for	an	indigenous	candidate.	In	the	2012	
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LAPOP	data	for	Guatemala,	most	respondents	said	they	were	either	Ladino	or	indigenous,	
indicative	of	a	divide	between	the	ladino	and	indigenous	citizens	within	Guatemalan	society.	
	 Language	is	coded	as	Spanish,	Mam,	K’iche’,	Kaqchiquel,	Q’eqchi’,	other	native,	or	
another	foreign	language.	It	is	expected	that	those	who	speak	an	indigenous	language	are	
more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	party	or	leader,	consistent	with	what	has	been	
observed	in	Bolivia.	
	 Indigenous	education	(or	ieducation)	is	a	variable	asking	respondents	about	
opportunities	for	students	of	indigenous	or	dark-skin	heritage	and	whether	students	from	
these	backgrounds	should	have	spots	reserved	for	them	at	universities.	This	variable	is	
coded	on	a	scale	from	1-7,	with	1	being	strongly	disagree	with	that	statement	and	7	being	
strongly	agree	with	the	statement.	The	expectation	is	that	those	who	would	be	more	likely	
to	support	an	indigenous	party	would	be	more	likely	to	strongly	agree	with	this	statement.	
This	question	is	meaningful	because	it	indicates	that	people	more	accepting	of	indigenous	
participation	in	society	at-large	will	be	more	likely	to	accept	an	indigenous	political	leader.		
	 The	other	variables	included	in	this	analysis	measure	socio-economic	and	political	
ideology	and	participation,	which	are	expected	to	have	an	effect	on	whether	respondents	
support	an	indigenous	party	or	leader.	The	variable	for	ideology	is	on	a	scale	from	1-10	with	
1	being	left	and	10	being	right.	While	there	is	not	an	expectation	that	ideology	will	have	a	
great	impact	on	whether	a	person	would	support	an	indigenous	party,	if	these	indigenous	
parties	do	take	a	turn	towards	populism,	it	very	well	could.	Using	the	rationale	of	Madrid’s	
model	for	Bolivia,	the	protest	variable	is	a	yes	or	no	to	the	question	“Have	you	marched	or	
demonstrated	in	a	protest	in	the	past	12	months?”	I	expect	if	respondents	who	protested	to	
be	more	likely	to	be	in	favor	of	an	indigenous	party	or	leader.	The	trust	in	political	parties	is	
measured	on	a	scale	from	1	to	7,	with	a	1	being	not	at	all	and	7	being	a	lot	of	trust.	I	expect	
respondents	who	say	they	do	not	trust	political	parties	to	be	more	likely	to	support	an	
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indigenous	party.	The	trade	meetings	variable	is	another	measure	of	the	political	
participation	of	the	respondents.	This	variable	is	measured	on	a	scale	from	1-4,	with	1	being	
a	respondent	attends	a	meeting	once	a	week	and	4	being	a	respondent	who	never	attends.	It	
is	not	expected	to	see	a	relationship	but	simply	another	measure	of	political	participation	
and	ideology.	
	 The	last	three	variables	are	sex,	age,	and	income.	These	variables	are	included	as	
controls	and	I	do	not	expect	them	to	heavily	influence	support	for	an	indigenous	party.	Sex	
is	coded	as	female,	where	female	respondents	are	coded	as	1	and	zero	if	male.	Age	in	the	
data	set	simply	takes	the	age	of	the	respondent.	The	range	of	ages	in	the	dataset	is	17	to	89.	
Income	is	in	10	income	brackets	and	ranges	from	no	monthly	income	to	monthly	income	
over	10,000	quetzales.		
Findings		
I	use	an	ordinary	logistic	regression	for	the	first	dependent	variable	predicting	
whether	a	citizen	would	vote	for	an	indigenous	person	for	president	and	an	ordered	
logistical	regression	in	the	second	model	with	the	dependent	variable	being	coded	as	1-4,	
asking	whether	an	indigenous	person	would	make	a	good	political	leader.	For	the	ordinary	
logit	model,	there	are	mostly	null	results	for	the	independent	variables	of	the	model.	
However,	encouragingly,	the	variable	for	indigenous	identity	is	statically	significant	at	the	
0.01	level	and	has	a	positive	coefficient.	This	shows	that	those	who	identify	as	indigenous	
are	more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	candidate	than	not.	The	variable	for	language	
spoken	shows	that	a	couple	of	the	indigenous	language	variables	approach	statistical	
significance	at	the	0.10	level.	These	results	confirm	part	of	the	hypothesis	that	an	
indigenous	identity	will	make	a	person	more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	political	
candidate.	Speaking	an	indigenous	language	should	have	an	effect	on	whether	a	person	
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would	support	an	indigenous	candidate	but	I	cannot	discern	with	certainty	because	of	a	low	
response	rate.		
[Table	1	Here]	
To	better	understand	the	results	of	this	model,	I	ran	the	odds	ratio	for	the	model.	The	odds	
ratio	tells	the	odds	of	a	person	supporting	an	indigenous	candidate	for	president	if	the	
respondent	is	indigenous.	In	this	model,	those	who	identify	as	indigenous	are	2.25	times	
more	likely	to	say	they	would	support	an	indigenous	candidate	for	president	of	Guatemala	
than	if	they	were	not	indigenous.	Those	who	spoke	K’iche’	at	home	as	a	child	are	5.45	times	
more	likely	to	say	they	would	support	an	indigenous	candidate	for	president.	However,	this	
variable	approaches	statistical	significance	at	the	0.10	level.	This	shows	speaking	an	
indigenous	language	could	have	a	positive	effect	if	a	survey	with	more	indigenous	language	
speakers	could	be	conducted.	Finally,	the	only	other	variable	that	is	statistically	significant	
is	age.	This	is	a	negative	coefficient	and	its	odds	ratio	is	.9828.	These	results	means	age	has	
little	to	no	effect	on	whether	a	person	will	support	an	indigenous	candidate	for	president.		
[Table	2	Here]	
For	the	second	model,	it	can	be	seen	that	the	statistically	significant	variables	are	for	those	
who	identify	as	indigenous	and	the	variable	for	income.	The	native	language	variable	or	the	
variable	for	support	for	indigenous	education	is	not	statistically	significant,	nor	are	other	
variables	such	as	ideology	or	participation.	However,	when	evaluating	the	predicted	
probabilities	for	the	key	independent	variables,	it	is	seen	that	those	who	identify	as	
indigenous	and	speak	an	indigenous	language	are	more	likely	to	strongly	disagree	with	the	
statement	of	whether	they	believe	an	indigenous	person	would	make	a	bad	leader.	
Participants	who	identify	as	indigenous	were	10.7	percent	more	likely	to	disagree	with	the	
statement	that	indigenous	leaders	make	bad	political	leaders,	holding	all	other	variables	
constant.	There	is	a	similar	finding	when	looking	at	differences	between	languages.	The	
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change	in	the	probability	a	person	will	strongly	disagree	with	the	statement	an	indigenous	
person	would	make	a	bad	political	leader	increases	by	3.4	percent	moving	from	a	Spanish	
speaker	to	an	indigenous	speaker,	holding	all	other	variables	constant.	This	is	seen	across	
all	indigenous	languages.	Indigenous	speakers	are	more	likely	to	strongly	disagree	with	the	
statement	than	Spanish	speakers.	This	is	not	surprising	given	that	it’s	expected	that	
indigenous	people	would	be	more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	leader.		
	 From	these	results,	it	can	be	concluded	that	there	is	some	support	for	the	hypothesis	
that	indigenous	people	will	be	more	likely	to	support	an	indigenous	leader	than	those	who	
are	Ladino	and	those	who	speak	Spanish.	It	does	appear	that	there	is	some	demand	or	at	the	
very	least	some	potential	support	for	indigenous	parties	in	Guatemala.	However,	some	
limitations	of	the	data	should	be	noted.	There	is	an	N	of	462	for	first	model	and	an	N	of	425	
for	the	second	model.	This	is	an	issue	because	it	is	a	very	low	response	rate	and	means	even	
more	people	gave	no	response	or	gave	no	answer	than	answered	the	question,	and	it	lowers	
the	predictive	power	of	the	model.	While	it	did	give	the	results	discussed	above,	I	am	not	
able	to	make	definite	conclusions	from	both	models	because	there	is	such	a	low	N.	Common	
remedies	such	as	replacing	missing	responses	with	averages	would	be	problematic	given	
that	over	50%	of	the	variable	would	then	be	averages.		
From	these	models,	it	appears	that	Guatemala	does	have	some	similar	
characteristics	to	other	Latin	American	countries	in	that	ethnicity	and	spoken	language	has	
an	impact	on	voting	behavior.		In	both	models,	identifying	as	an	indigenous	person	and	
speaking	an	indigenous	language	makes	a	person	more	likely	to	vote	for	an	indigenous	
person	and	party	in	Guatemala	and	less	likely	to	say	an	indigenous	person	would	make	a	
bad	political	leader.	The	main	issue	is	the	low	response	rate	for	the	question	of	whether	
citizens	think	that	an	indigenous	person	would	make	a	bad	political	leader	or	not.	Thus,	I	
am	able	to	conclude	that	there	appears	to	be	some	evidence	that	the	Maya	population	would	
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support	an	indigenous	party	in	Guatemala	and	that	the	first	hypothesis	is	not	falsified	by	
this	admittedly	limited	data.	The	questions	remain,	however:	why	have	political	parties	that	
attempt	to	represent	the	Maya,	struggled	to	gain	the	support	of	the	Maya	population?	Is	
there	a	desire	for	a	successful	pan-Maya	party?	
Other	Explanations	for	a	lack	of	a	Pan-Maya	Party	
	 The	previous	sections	attempts	to	see	if	there	is	demand	for	an	indigenous	leader	in	
Guatemala.		The	dependent	variables	for	the	two	models	asked	if	a	citizen	would	vote	for	an	
indigenous	person	for	president	and	whether	they	believe	that	a	dark-skinned	person	
would	make	a	bad	political	leader.	However,	there	was	a	low	response	rate	for	the	
dependent	variables	and	key	independent	variables.	In	spite	of	this	issue,	I	am	able	to	
determine	that	there	appears	to	be	some	indigenous	support	for	a	hypothetical	indigenous	
candidate	for	president	or	support	a	hypothetical	indigenous	leader.	Even	with	the	results	
of	the	logistic	models,	there	is	still	a	need	to	evaluate	more	in-depth	the	diversity	of	political	
participation	in	the	Guatemalan	Maya	community.	By	evaluating	political	participation	at	
the	local	level	of	government,	it	can	be	seen	that	there	is	a	diversity	of	ways	for	the	Maya	
population	to	participate.	Participation	at	the	local	level	demonstrates	the	label	of	failed	
case	is	not	an	accurate	description	of	Guatemalan	indigenous	participation.	I	will	now	
highlight	three	factors	important	to	understanding	how	the	Maya	population	participates:	
the	“Cargo	System”,	civic	committees,	and	divisions	within	the	Maya	community.		
Cargo	System	
	 One	of	the	ways	Maya	participate	at	the	local	level	in	Guatemala	is	through	the	
“Cargo	System.”	The	“Cargo	System”	is	an	institution	put	into	place	during	Spanish	rule	and	
is	a	system	of	community	service.	This	community	service	system	expects	the	men	of	a	
village	to	perform	three	acts	of	community	service	without	reimbursement.	(Rasch	2011a;	
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Ekern	2011)	These	acts	can	be	of	a	civil	or	religious	nature.	Historically,	this	system	would	
help	in	the	ranking	of	members	of	the	community	and	attempts	to	include	all	members	of	
the	community.	In	turn,	political	positions	such	as	the	council	of	elders	are	based	on	one’s	
participation	in	the	Cargo	System.	The	council	of	elders	in	villages	are	the	ones	who	act	as	
administrators	for	civil	and	religious	affairs.	This	system	of	elder	leadership	was	banned	in	
1987	in	Totonicapán	due	to	a	logging	scandal	and	led	to	mistrust	in	the	elders	and	has	been	
in	decline	in	other	towns	in	K’iche’	Guatemala	like	Santa	Maria	(Ekern	2011;	Rasch	2011a).		
This	led	to	the	opening	up	of	the	cargo	system	to	make	it	more	democratic	but	the	
community	service	aspect	of	the	“Cargo	System”	is	still	in	use	today	(Ekern	2011).	Even	
with	its	decline,	the	Cargo	System	is	still	influential	in	how	leaders	are	selected,	even	with	
the	process	being	democratic.		
In	spite	of	the	continuing	importance	of	the	Cargo	System,	there	is	a	divide	within	
the	Mayan	community	over	the	continuation	of	traditions	like	the	Cargo	System.	This	divide	
is	between	those	who	want	village	politics	to	be	concentrated	on	the	community	as	a	whole	
against	those	who	want	to	be	treated	more	as	individuals	(Rasch	2011a;	Ekern	2011).	
Those	who	want	a	more	community	based	politics	tend	to	be	older	and	want	to	maintain	
traditional	village	institutions	whereas	the	younger	generations	are	moving	towards	a	more	
western	style	of	politics,	where	the	concentration	is	on	the	individual.	This	move	away	from	
the	Cargo	System	and	traditional	institutions	by	younger	generations	is	their	attempt	to	
interact	with	the	Guatemalan	state	as	individuals	and	not	through	indigenous	institutions	or	
identity.		
Civic	Committees	
	 Another	means	through	which	the	Maya	participate	are	through	civic	committees.	
Civic	committees	are	a	way	of	organization	in	Guatemala	that	allows	groups	to	form	a	
committee	to	support	a	candidate	for	public	office	without	having	to	form	a	political	party.	
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These	committees	have	become	a	popular	tool	for	indigenous	groups	at	the	local	level	to	
support	candidates	for	office	without	having	to	put	the	resources	required	to	form	a	
political	party.	The	use	of	civic	committees	has	been	a	popular	tool	among	Maya	activists	
(Pallister	2013;	McNeish	2008;	Hale	2002).	Driving	the	use	of	civic	committees	is	the	fact	
many	mainstream	political	parties	ignore	indigenous	issues.	Thus,	at	the	local	level,	Maya	
groups	find	forming	civic	committees	is	one	way	to	have	their	voices	heard.		
	 Maya	groups	have	had	some	success	electing	Maya/indigenous	candidates	to	
political	office.	The	greatest	success	occurred	in	2003,	where	civic	committees	helped	win	
27	mayoralties	(Pallister	2013).	A	case	where	civic	committees	have	had	significant	success	
is	in	Quetzaltenango.	The	success	in	Quetzaltenango	is	profound	because	Quetzaltenango	is	
the	second	largest	city	in	Guatemala	and	is	the	unofficial	capital	of	K’iche’	Maya.	The	
political	organization	and	its	civic	committee,	Xel-ju,	supported	Rigerberto	Queme	Chay	for	
mayor	of	Quetzaltenango	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s.	Queme	was	elected	mayor	in	1995	
and	1999	and	lost	in	the	2004	election	(Rasch	2011b).		
	 Xel-ju	was	founded	as	a	Mayan	organization	in	the	1970s.	Influencing	the	decision	to	
form	as	a	Maya	political	organization	was	the	motivation	to	gain	political	office	at	the	local	
level	for	the	Maya	community	in	Guatemala,	especially	in	the	Quetzaltenango	area.	It	has	
been	primarily	concentrated	in	Quetzaltenango	and	represents	mostly	K’iche’	Maya.	Since	
it’s	founding	in	the	1970s,	Xel-ju,	has	walked	a	fine	line	to	not	incur	the	wrath	of	the	military	
during	Guatemala’s	civil	war	and	to	help	in	negotiating	the	recognition	of	indigenous	rights	
in	Quetzaltenango.		
	 Because	Xel-ju	is	an	indigenous	organization,	they	make	efforts	to	recruit	
indigenous	candidates	for	political	office	(Rasch	2011b).	However,	Xel-ju	struggled	to	gain	
political	office	and	this	eventually	led	to	a	decision	by	the	organization	to	also	include	
Ladinos	in	the	organization.	By	becoming	more	inclusive	of	Ladinos,	this	helped	lead	to	
	 24	
success	for	Xel-ju	in	the	1990s.	In	the	1995	campaign	for	mayor	of	Quetzaltenango,	Xel-ju	
ran	Maya	and	Ladino	candidates	and	also	used	both	Maya	and	Ladino	imagery	and	symbols	
(Rasch	2011b).	Using	this	approach,	Xel-ju	led	by	Queme	was	able	to	gain	power	in	
Quetzaltenango	in	1995	and	1999.		
	 However,	making	Xel-ju	a	more	inclusive	organization	caused	divisions	that	proved	
to	be	its	undoing	by	the	mid2000s.	Even	when	Queme	won	reelection	in	1999,	there	was	
already	a	division	within	the	organization	(Rasch	2001b;	Rasch	2011c).	The	division	came	
from	those	within	the	organization	who	wanted	Xel-ju	to	be	focus	solely	on	the	indigenous	
populations,	not	the	inclusive	route	Queme	and	others	were	taking	the	organization.	In	
addition,	there	were	criticisms	such	as	Queme	was	including	allowing	Ladinos	in	the	
running	of	the	organization	and	subsequent	corruption	and	scandals	shortly	after	Queme	
allowed	Ladinos	more	say	within	the	organization.	Other	criticisms	of	Queme’s	
multicultural	approach	was	to	make	Xel-ju	more	democratic	and	opened	up	politics	for	the	
indigenous	population	that	is	more	rural	and	poorer.	Many	within	Xel-ju	found	this	to	be	
problematic	because	this	population	did	not	necessarily	identify	as	Maya	and	including	
groups	other	than	Maya	ran	contrary	to	what	the	founding	members	of	Xel-ju	wanted	the	
organization	to	be.		
	 The	divisions	within	Xel-ju	were	problematic	for	Queme	during	his	second	
campaign	for	mayor.	In	spite	of	these	divisions,	he	was	able	to	overcome	these	issues	and	
win	a	second	term	in	1999.	However,	in	the	2004	election,	Xel-ju	was	a	distant	fourth	and	it	
has	not	achieved	the	level	of	success	compared	to	when	Queme	was	in	office.	To	date,	Xel-ju	
has	been	the	most	successful	indigenous	organization	in	Guatemala	that	has	made	use	of	
civic	committees.		
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Inter-Maya	Divisions	
	 Along	with	different	means	of	participating,	there	are	divisions	within	the	
Maya/indigenous	community.	There	are	divisions	along	linguist	lines,	divisions	between	
different	Mayan	groups,	and	divisions	along	class	lines.	These	divisions	are	often	times	
brushed	aside	when	explaining	indigenous	political	activities	in	Guatemala.	Scholars	
seemingly	treat	the	Maya	as	a	homogenous	group.		In	reality,	the	divisions	within	the	Maya	
community	are	deep	enough	that	assuming	the	Maya	are	one,	unified	groups	leads	to	
missing	key	divisions	which	can	help	understand	Maya	political	participation	(Vogt	2015;	
Ekern	2011;	Rasch	2011b;	Rasch	2011c).		
	 Many	scholars	do	not	take	into	account	the	divisions	within	the	indigenous/Mayan	
community	in	Guatemala	due	to	the	success	the	Mayan	movement	has	had	over	the	past	few	
decades.	The	Mayan	movement	developed	later	due	to	Guatemala’s	civil	war	and	pursued	
organizational	goals	differently	because	of	its	experience	during	the	war.	During	the	1970s,	
groups	within	the	Mayan	Movement	began	pursuing	political	routes	for	advancing	
indigenous	goals.	However,	these	actions	were	met	with	violence	and	have	influenced	the	
movement’s	actions	to	the	present	(Warren	2003).	This	has	led	to	the	Mayan	Movement	to	
concentrate	more	upon	the	recognition	of	indigenous	rights	and	preservation	of	indigenous	
culture	than	building	a	pan-Mayan	party.	These	rights	were	recognized	in	the	peace	accords	
that	ended	the	civil	war	(Yashar	2005;	Warren	1998).	However,	these	reforms	were	put	to	a	
vote	that	included	language	recognizing	indigenous	rights	in	the	constitution	and	were	
defeated	in	a	low-turnout	vote.		
	 While	the	Mayan	Movement	has	experienced	some	success	in	gaining	indigenous	
rights	in	Guatemala,	the	movement	has	stagnated	in	recent	years	and	still	is	not	a	significant	
player	in	Guatemalan	national	politics.	Part	of	this	reason	is	due	the	significant	ethnic,	
linguistic,	and	cultural	divisions	within	the	Mayan	community.	There	are	over	20	different	
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Mayan	language	groups	(Vogt	2015).	One	attempt	to	unify	the	Mayan	Movement	into	a	
cohesive	political	movement	regardless	of	Mayan	groups	is	Rigoberta	Menchu’s	Winaq	
party.	However,	as	discussed	earlier,	she	has	not	been	successful	and	the	Mayan	community	
remains	very	fractured.		
	 When	evaluating	where	the	indigenous	population	has	had	the	most	success	
politically	in	Guatemala,	it	has	predominately	been	within	K’iche’	speaking	regions.	
Ribgoberta	Menchu	and	leaders	of	the	Xel-ju	organization	are	K’iche’	and	Quetzaltenango	is	
considered	to	be	the	capital	of	K’iche’	Mayas.	Other	Mayan	linguistic	groups	concentrate	
more	upon	culture	and	linguistic	education	and	preservation	than	on	running	for	political	
office	(Hale	2002;	Bastos	and	Camus	2006).		
	 Along	with	differences	between	different	Mayan	linguistic	groups,	there	are	
differences	within	linguistic	groups.	Many	of	the	issues	that	has	hampered	the	Xel-ju	
organization	after	1999	can	be	traced	to	differences	within	the	K’iche’	Maya	community.	
When	Rigoberto	Queme	Chay	became	the	mayor	of	Quetzaltenango,	one	of	the	policies	he	
implemented	included	building	roads	to	the	rural	areas	outside	of	the	city	limits	of	
Quetzaltenango	and	participatory	democracy	institutions	(Rasch	2011b;	Rasch	2011c).	The	
goal	of	these	policies	was	to	open	up	politics	of	Quetzaltenango	to	these	rural	populations	to	
politics	and	to	build	an	indigenous	way	to	conduct	politics.		
However,	there	is	quite	a	difference	between	the	indigenous	populations	that	live	in	
urban	Quetzaltenango	and	those	who	live	in	the	surrounding	rural	areas.	The	indigenous	
population	that	lives	in	the	rural	areas	tends	to	identify	as	indigenous	rather	than	Mayan	
and	these	populations	also	tend	to	be	poorer	(Rasch	2011b;	Rasch	2011c).	Those	who	
identify	as	Mayan	tend	to	be	urban	and	middle	class.	This	divide	could	be	seen	in	the	
divisions	within	Xel-ju.	Many	within	the	organization	were	upset	with	Queme	spending	
resources	to	implement	the	policies	of	road	building	and	direct	democracy.	The	criticisms	
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were	by	those	who	wanted	to	keep	Xel-ju	as	a	more	indigenous	organization	rather	than	
open	it	up	and	make	it	more	multicultural.	As	a	result	of	this	divide	within	the	K’iche’	
community	in	Quetzaltenango,	Xel-ju	was	able	to	gain	office	for	its	candidates	on	municipal	
councils	and	elect	Queme	as	mayor	in	1995	and	1999.		In	subsequent	elections,	Xel-ju	only	
partially	pursued	the	votes	of	the	excluded	indigenous	and	Ladino	populations	and	was	a	
factor	in	Xel-ju	becoming	a	less	relevant	political	play	in	Quetzaltenango.		
	 Thus,	simply	classifying	Guatemala	as	a	‘failed’	case	is	simplistic	and	likely	a	false	
classification.	A	more	accurate	view	of	how	Mayans	are	participating	politically	is	to	look	at	
the	diversity	of	their	institutions	at	the	local	level	and	divisions	in	identity	that	is	observed	
within	the	Mayan	community.	Part	of	this	concentration	on	the	local	level	for	participating	
is	due	to	historical	violence	and	discrimination.	However,	not	taking	into	account	the	
differences	within	the	Mayan	community,	leads	to	assumptions	about	the	Mayan	
community	that	is	problematic.	Future	research	in	this	area	of	Mayan	politics	will	need	to	
take	these	factors	into	account	in	order	to	get	a	more	holistic	view	of	Mayan	politics.	
Conclusion	
	 Overall	this	paper	evaluates	why	a	pan-Mayan	party	has	not	developed	on	the	level	
seen	in	other	Latin	American	countries.	First,	I	ran	model	a	model	based	upon	what	Madrid	
(2012)	has	said	is	the	path	for	an	indigenous	party	to	gain	mass	support.	In	the	second	half	
of	my	empirical	section,	I	demonstrated	that	Mayans	do	participate	politically	but	
concentrate	on	local	and	traditional	institutions.	In	addition,	divisions	within	the	Mayan	
community	are	a	factor	that	prevents	any	mobilization	outside	of	the	local	level.	I	am	able	to	
conclude	that	while	a	pan-Mayan	has	not	developed,	this	does	not	mean	Guatemala	is	a	
“failed	case”	but	demonstrates	how	diverse	the	Mayan	politically	community	is.	
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	 The	diversity	of	political	institutions	seen	in	the	Mayan	community	presents	
numerous	routes	for	future	research	could	take.	One	route	would	be	to	begin	taking	survey	
of	the	different	traditional	institutions	in	place	in	Mayan	villages.	This	would	require	
extensive	fieldwork	and	interviews	with	leaders	in	these	villages.	However,	to	begin	to	
better	understand	these	traditional	institutions,	there	is	a	need	to	observe	how	they	
actually	work.		
	 Another	area	of	future	research	could	take	is	evaluating	gender	differences	within	
the	Mayan	community.	Van	Cott	(2010a)	speaks	about	the	need	to	evaluate	the	intersection	
of	ethnicity	and	gender.	Within	the	Mayan	community,	there	is	still	a	view	females	can	only	
participate	if	they	finish	their	other	duties,	such	as	childrearing	(Ekern	2011).	
Understanding	how	females	within	the	Mayan	community	have	or	have	not	overcome	
traditional	roles	would	give	a	more	holistic	view	of	the	entire	Mayan	community	
participates.		
	 Building	off	the	need	to	evaluate	groups	who	are	excluded	in	the	Mayan	community,	
is	the	need	to	evaluate	the	democratic	nature	of	traditional	institutions	(Van	Cott	2010a).	
This	thesis	has	demonstrated	how	Mayans	in	Guatemala	are	participating	at	the	local	level	
rather	than	attempting	to	build	a	nationwide	pan-Mayan	party.	A	fair	question	to	ask	is	
whether	these	tradition	institutions	are	democratic	and	inclusive	of	all	members	of	the	
Mayan	community.		
Overall,	future	research	on	Mayan	political	participation	could	take	many	different	
paths.	There	is	a	need	to	evaluate	these	traditional	and	local	institutions.	More	than	
anything	there	is	a	need	to	understand	more	in-depth	how	the	Guatemalan	Mayan	
community	participates	politically.	
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Appendix	
	
Figure	1:	Would	you	vote	for	an	indigenous	person	for	president?	with	Odds	Ratios	
P	>	.10*	P>.05**	P>.01***	
	
	 32	
	
Table	2:	Would	a	dark	skinned	person	make	a	bad	political	leader?	
P	>	.10*	P>.05**	P>.01***	
	
